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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case stems from Hausladen v. Knoche which was heard and decided by the
Idaho Court of Appeals I and thereafter by the Idaho Supreme Court2 (hereinafter referred
to as "the Parenting Coordinator issue"). In August of 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court
issued a remand on "the Parenting Coordinator issue" to the district court in Kootenai
County. After no "activity" in the custody case for over three (3) years (and the custody
case had been "closed") on October 13, 2010, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Judge
Peterson presided over a "scheduling hearing." Appellant received notice of the hearing
via telephone at approximately 4:30 p.m. on October 12, 2010. Although the Supreme
Court's opinion ordered for the district court to make a "determination" of the issues on
remand, Magistrate Judge Clark Peterson scheduled a two (2) hour "evidentiary hearing"
(a new "trial" on the remanded issues) for November 29, 2010. When Appellant objected
to "retrying" "the Parenting Coordinator Issue", Judge Peterson stated, among other
things: "Mr. Hausladen may have won the appeal, but he has lost since the case has been
remanded to this court." (emphasis added). Judge Peterson's comment was followed by a
smirk/grin.

Judge Peterson's comments and facial expressions were a precursor for

Appellant's upcoming treatment in the Kootenai County judicial system following
remand. After all, Appellant apparently committed the greatest of all sins in their eyes,
he dared appeal a decision of a Kootenai County judge and prevailed.
The issue now on appeal is simple: Is Appellant authorized to appeal a "final
judgment" without the express, written consent of the magistrate court?

1
2

Hausladen v. Knoche, (Idaho App. 9/24/2008)
Hausladen v. Knoche, 149 Idaho 449 (2012).
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FACTS

This custody case started in the Fall of 2000. A custody order/judgment regarding
custody was entered on or about May 29, 2001. Shari Knoche ("Mother") filed a petition
for change of custody on or about October 14, 2003, a trial transpired in early November,
2004 and an Order Modifying Custody was entered February 2, 2005, said order
appointed John Sahlin as the Parenting Coordinator, however, no power or authority was
given to the Parenting Coordinator. "The Parenting Coordinator issue" was litigated and
appealed following the February 2, 2005, order. A rather long and detailed explanation of
the facts relating to "the Parenting Coordinator issue" is set forth on pages 191

200 of

the Clerk's Record (incorporated herein by this reference).
The magistrate judge originally appointed to this case was Barry Watson. On
appeal to district court, Charles Hosack was the presiding judge.

Shortly after the

"Parenting Coordinator Issue" was appealed, Judge Watson disqualified himself.
Benjamin Simpson was thereafter appointed as the magistrate. While this case was on
appeal to the Court of Appeals, Benjamin Simpson was appointed as a district court judge
in Kootenai County (taking the position of Charles Hosack). Clark Peterson was then
appointed the magistrate judge for this case and his first issue was the "Parenting
Coordinator Issue" remanded from the Supreme Court ("scheduling hearing" on October
13, 2010). Due to statements at the October 13, 2010, hearing by Judge Peterson that, in
Appellant's view show bias, Appellant filed motion for disqualification for cause.
Although I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5) states that Judge Peterson "shall be without authority to act
further" in the case until the disqualification for cause was heard, Judge Peterson
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"moved" "the Parenting Coordinator Issue" to district court and later voluntarily
disqualified himself from the case. 3 Judge Simpson previously was the magistrate judge
in this case (before remand from the Supreme Court) he also acted for a short time
(issuing one general "Order of Remand"4) as the district court judge on remand.
Although Judge Simpson was previously the magistrate judge previously in this case he
apparently had no conflict of interest prior to issuing the "Order of Remand", but he later
disqualified himself prior to issuing any other orders in the case. 5 John Patrick Luster
was then appointed as the district court judge on remand.

Following Judge Peterson's

voluntary disqualification (which clearly under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is void
since Judge Peterson had no authority in this case until Appellant's motion for
disqualification for cause was heard

IRCP 40(d)(5)) Judge James Stow was appointed

as magistrate judge. In short, although a rule, statute or case may require the magistrate
court or district court to do something, it is simply ignored by the court if it benefits
Appellant in some way. It does not take a rocket scientist to figure out that the Kootenai
County "judicial system" has been "dog piling" onto Appellant in order to "quash" "the
Parenting Coordinator issue."

3 This issue was raised and objected to in magistrate court and district court and, as always in this case,
ignored.
4 Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. l, page 36.
5 The judgment in favor of Appellant (against Sahlin) for costs on the appeal was forwarded to Judge
Simpson's office for signing. Although Judge Simpson signed a general "Order of Remand" within a few
days of the case being transferred to district court by Magistrate Judge Peterson, Appellant's judgment
went several months without being signed by Judge Simpson (even though Appelllant called Judge
Simpson's office several times to inquire about it's entry).
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

(1) Sahlin still has no standing and/or the magistrate court never had jurisidiction
over "the Parenting Coordinator issue."
(2) "The Parenting Coordinator issue" was improperly handled on remand and the
magistrate court's decisions are void for lack of jurisdiction over "The Parenting
Coordinator Issue".
(3) The district court's "ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL" resulted in an error in
law.
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ISSUE #1: Sahlin still has no standing and/or the magistrate court never had jurisidiction
over "the Parenting Coordinator issue."
"The question of jurisdiction is fundamental and cannot be ignored. Even if
jurisdictional questions are not raised by the parties, the Court must address them on its
own initiative."6 ( emphasis added).

"Even if jurisdictional questions are not raised by the parties, we are obligated to
address them, when applicable, on our own initiative ... "Further, parties cannot confer
jurisdiction upon the court by stipulation, agreement or estoppel." 7
"It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to

invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing." 8
"Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court before
reaching the merits of the case." 9
"The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues
the party wishes to have adjudicated." 10
"Jurisdictional issues, such as standing, and the interpretation of statutory
language that confers standing are questions of law over which this Court exercise free
review." 11

Diamond v. Sandpoint Title Insurance, 132 Idaho 145, 148 (1998) citing H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho State
Bd. Of Prof'l Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987).
7 H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State B. of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646,
648 (1987).
8 Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 103 (2002) citing Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term
Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124 (2000).
9 Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104 (2002) as cited in Abolafia v. Reeves, 152 Idaho 898,902
(2012).
10 Abolafia v. Reeves, 152 Idaho 898,902 (2012).
11 Christian v. Mason, 148 Idaho 149, 151 (2009).
6
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" ... [S]tanding is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time, including on
appeal." 12

13

The Idaho Court of Appeals explained the generally used term "jurisdiction" in
State v. Armstrong, 195 P.3d 731, 735 (Idaho App. 2008):
The term 'jurisdiction' used continuously in a
variety of situations, has so many different meanings
that no single statement can be entirely satisfactory as a
definition. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941),
17 Cal.2d 280, 109 P.2d 942 (Abelleira).) Essentially,
'Lack of
jurisdictional errors are of two types.
jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense
means an entire absence of authority over the subject
matter or the parties.' (Id. At p. 288, 109 P.2d 942.)
When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense,
an ensuing judgment is void, and 'thus vulnerable to
direct or collateral attack at any time.' (Barquis v.
Merchants Collection Assn. (1972), 7 Cal.3d 94, 101
Cal.Rptr. 745, 496 P.2d 817 (Barquis).)
However, 'in its ordinary usage the phrase 'lack
of jurisdiction' is not limited to these fundamental
situations.' (Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288, 109
P.2d 942.) It may also 'be applied to a case where,
though the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has
no 'jurisdiction' (or power) to act except in a particular
manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to give
certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence
of certain procedural prerequisites.' (Ibid.) '[W]hen a
statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the
court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it
has exceeded its jurisdiction.' (Id. At p. 290, 109 P.2d
942.) When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but
acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is
merell voidable. (In re Marriage of Gaddard (2004), 33
Cal.4t 49, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 90 P.3d 1209;
Conservatorship of O'Connor (1996) 48 Cal.App.4 th
1076, 1088, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 386.)

The Idaho Supreme Court made the following analysis on standing in Abolafia:
12
13

Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 162 (2008).
Abolafia at 902.
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Because Adler served at the pleasure of the
magistrate court, it could terminate his appointment at
any time when the court, in its sole discretion,
determined that it no longer needed his services. The
court's decision to terminate his services did not have to
be supported by factual findings, nor did the court have
to give a reason. All that was required was for the court
to decide that it no longer desired Adler's services.
Once the court made that decision and entered the
order terminating him as a guardian ad litem, he ceased
to be the guardian ad litem. Adler had no right to
continue the role of guardian ad litem. Adler had no
right to continue in the role of guardian ad litem for the
children, nor did he have any legally protected interest
that was impacted by the court terminating him as
guardian. Because he was not a party to this litigation
and did not represent a party, he had no right to
challenge the court's decision regarding the custody of
the children. He had no standing to appeal to the
district court because he had no justiciable interest in
this litigation. Although he may have been miffed by
his termination as guardian ad litem, injury to his pride
is not justiciable. After he was terminated as guardian
ad litem on February 15, 2008, his actions in appealing
to the district court have simply been those of an
officious intermeddler. He had no standing to appeal. 14
It is obvious that Sahlin has never been a party to this action. Sahlin has never

filed any motion to intervene under I.R.C.P. 24 (a), (b) or (c). Sahlin has never paid a
filing fee required before intervening into a case. Sahlin was only appointed to act as a
Parenting Coordinator pursuant to a court order.

Sahlin' s appointment as Parenting

Coordinator was terminated by the Court by order dated January 11, 2006. 15 Following
the entry of Judge Watson's order terminating Sahlin's appointment, Sahlin was no
longer a Parenting Coordinator in this case. Following the entry of Judge Watson's order
terminating Sahlin's appointment, Sahlin no longer had any "special ties" of any kind

14

15

Abolafia at 902.
Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. 1, page 137.
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with this case and therefore, had no standing, to interevene in any way, especially via a
motion for order to show cause.
Sahlin chose to file a Motion for Order to Show Cause (for which no Order to
Show Cause was issued) 16 almost five (5) months after he was terminated by the Court
from his position as Parenting Coordinator. Just as analyzed by this Court in the Abolafia
case, a Parenting Coordinator served at the pleasure of the court, was not a party to the
action and lacked standing to take part in the case following his termination.
LC. Section 32-717D(4) allows the court (in the custody case) to review any
dispute regarding payment of Parenting Coordinator fees upon the request of the
Parenting Coordinator or either party.

LR.C.P. 16(1)(11) allows the court (in the

custody case) to order payment upon motion by the Parenting Coordinator. Neither
LC. Section 32-717D or LR.C.P. 16(1) allows a parenting coordinator to file a motion for
order to show cause. Most importantly, neither LC. Section 32-717D or LR.C.P. 16(1)
allows FORMER parenting coordinator to file a motion for order to show cause (or any
motion) in the custody case. The only individuals who had standing to file a motion in
the custody case following the entry of the order terminating the parenting coordinator
were Mother and Appellant, the only PARTIES in the case.
Most importantly, no statute, rule or case sets forth a legal basis for a Parenting
Coordinator or FORMER Parenting Coordinator to file a motion for order to show cause.
In fact, Sahlin' s actions go beyond the actions of Ken Adler in the Abolafia case - at least
Adler appeared to be taking action on behalf of the children (his argument) whereas
Sahlin was merely trying a shortcut method for collecting money for ultra vires acts. No

16 Judge Watson was correct in never issuing an Order to Show Cause since Sahlin obviously had no
standing to submit said request and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do so.
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matter how you analyze it, Sahlin has been nothing more than an "officious intermeddler"
in this case since his termination.
Sahlin is in no way prejudiced.

Although Idaho law prevents Sahlin from

intervening in a custody case to pursue his "claim", he was entitled to pursue his claim in
a new, separate action Gust like anyone else in a similar postion). Just because Sahlin
~

a Parenting Coordinator does not mean he is entitled to special treatment under the

law.
How is this situation any different then any alleged creditor of a party in a custody
case filing a motion for order to show cause in the custody case in order to seek
renumeration?
As set forth above, jurisdictional matters may be brought up for the first time on
appeal, Appellant's stance has been consistent on this issue throughout the long history of
this case: Sahlin has no standing to pursue a claim in a custody case which Sahlin is not
a party and not a parenting coordinator. This was argued before the "trial" (a hearing on
Sahlin' s motion for order to show cause) 17 commenced; on appeal in the district court;
on appeal in the Idaho Court of Appeals; on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court; on
remand in the magistrate court when it wrongfully exercised authority over the case and
attempted to "retry" the case (Judge Peterson); in district court (Judge Simpson and Judge
Luster) when said court transferred the case to magistrate court for a "determination"
before said court made a "determination" 18 ; in magistrate court (Judge Stow) when it
improperly exercised jurisdiction over the matter on remand; and finally on appeal to the
district court (Judge Luster) when said court wrongfully dismissed the appeal which is

17
18

Clerk's Record, S. Ct. Docket No. 40274-2012, Vol. 1, page 199.
Even though the Idaho Supreme Court order the district court to make the "determination."
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currently the issue in this Court.

At some point, Appellant hopes that a court will

recognize that a former Parenting Coordinator is legally barred from intervening in a
custody case after his appointment has been terminated and a magistrate court lacks
jurisdiction to hear a former Parenting Coordinator's motion for order to show cause.
I am sure at this point Sahlin will "argue" that setting aside prior court orders
relating to his motion for order to show cause would somehow deny him of due process.
Sahlin, as a nonparty to this case and only tie is that of a FORMER Parenting
Coordinator, is not legally allowed to take intervene in this custody case. Sahlin found
himself in the same position that any other person that claimed he/she was owed money
by a parent (party) in a custody case: draft a complaint and summons, pay a filing fee,
serve the complaint and summons to the defendant and proceed with litigation in the
ordinary and customary manner. That way, the defendant would have the ability to
demand a jury trial 19, take part in discovery, subpoena and call witnesses and actually be
able to prepare for trial instead of being "ambushed" and forced into a "trial" at a hearing
scheduled for a "motion for order to show cause" (in which no order to show cause was
issued) as happened in this case. Although Salin did use the same basic forms (a motion
for order to show cause with no order to show cause issued by the court) to collect
Parenting Coordinator fees in the past he had no standing to do so and no standing to file
any documentation in the custody case after he is dismissed as the Parenting Coordinator.

19 Even ifSahlin filed a small claims action, a defendant could have the case moved out of small claims and
could demand a jury trial.

Appellant's Brief

14

ISSUE #2: "The Parenting Coordinator issue" was improperly handled on remand
and the magistrate court's decisions are void for lack of iurisdiction over "The
Parenting Coordinator Issue".

I.R.C.P. 83(u)(1)2° relates to the authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction of a
district court when a case is appealed from the magistrate division of the district court. 21
I.A.R. 38(c) relates to remittiturs and states: "When the opinion filed has become
final in accordance with this rule, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall issue and file a
remittitur with the district court ... [t]he remittitur shall advise the district court or
administrative agency that the opinion has become final and that the district court or
administrative agency shall forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion."
I.A.R. 2(b)(1) defines district court as ". . . the district courts of all judicial
districts but shall not include the magistrates divisions thereof."
The Idaho Supreme Court stated the following: "We find that the district court
erred in affirming the magistrate court's judgment ordering Hausladen to pay for Sahlin's
services, but we remand for a determination of whether Sahlin is entitled to fees in
accordance with Idaho Code Section 32-71 7D(3 ). " Hausladen v. Sahlin, 2010 Opinion
No. 82, page 1 2. (emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court further stated: "We vacate the district court's order
affirming the magistrate court's judgment ordering Hausladen to pay for Sahlin's services
and remand for a determination as to whether Sahlin is entitled to payment pursuant to

20 Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not involving a trial de novo, the
district court shall review the case on the record and determine the appeal as an appellate court in the same
manner and upon the same standards of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court
under the statutes and law of the state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court. (emphasis added).
21 Please note:
an intermediate appellate court's authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction is
substantially different in an appeal (I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l)) compared to a remand (limits set forth in the
opinion/remittitu r).
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LC. Section 32-717D(3) and I.R.C.P. 16(1)(1)." Hausladen v. Sahlin, 2010 Opinion No.
82, page 1 - 2. (emphasis added).
"The general rule is that, on remand, a trial court [district court in this case] has
authority to take actions it is specifically directed to take, or those which are
subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court."

Walters v. Industrial

Indem. Co., 130 Idaho 836,838 (1997). 22 (emphasis added).
An intermediate appellate court's 23 authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction is
substantially different on an appeal from the magistrate court versus a remand from the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. In an appeal from the magistrate court, as this
Court explained in its "REMITTITUR Clarified", I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l) defines the outer
boundaries of authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. 24 The other
subsections of I.R.C.P. 83 also apply to an appeal from magistrate court to the district
court. In essence, the district court stands in the shoes of the Supreme Court for purposes
of the Idaho Appellate Rules. On remand, however, the general rules for an appeal are
not applicable - the district court's role is limited to only the specific actions directed in

Compare the Supreme Court's opinion/remittitur in this case with the following cases where the
Idaho Supreme Court (or Court of Appeals) specifically instructs the trial court (lower court) to get
additional "evidence" and/or "fact-finding": Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guaranty, 35949 (Idaho 7-12010), Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 35949 (Idaho 4-26-2010), Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho
39 (2009), Akers v. Mortensen, 33587/33694 (Idaho 1-22-2009), State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112 (App.
2007), Mountainview Landowners Co-op v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861 (2006), Akers v. D.L. White Const., 142
Idaho 293 (2005), Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342 (2005), Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham,
LLC, 141 Idaho 185 (2005).
SEE ALSO: Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624, 627-628 (2007): "The order of the trial court is vacated.
The case is remanded for proceedings which require the mother to return the child to Idaho." Schultz v.
Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 866 (2008): "We reverse the magistrate court's order as the lower court abused its
discretion, and remand to another magistrate judge for further consideration." Simpson v. Trinity Mission
Health, 2010 Opinion No. 142, pg. 5: "We remand to the Commission to determine whether the interests
of justice require admission of additional evidence on Simpson's behalf."
23 The district court in this instance.
24 With certain other restrictions depending on the issues presented on appeal, exceptions under the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure, etc.
22
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the opinion/remittitur of the higher court (and the specific appellate rules relating to
remand/remi ttitur).
This issue stems from a fundamental issue in the law: subject matter jurisdiction.
At the beginning of the first semester of civil procedure, the basic concept of jurisdiction
is covered.

In order for a trial court to take action in a case, the court must have

jurisdiction over the person(s)/entity(ies) (personal jurisdiction) and over the subject
matter of the case (subject matter jurisdiction). Subject matter jurisdiction is also referred
to as "authority" or "power" to hear the case. Once a case/issue is decided by a trial court
and a party timely files an appeal (or fails to timely appeal the issue), the trial court then
lacks authority (subject matter jurisdiction) over the case/issue. 25

During the appeal

process, only the appellate court has authority (subject matter jurisdiction) over the
issue/case. 26 In this case, when the appeal took place from magistrate court to district
court (Judge Hosack), I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l) set forth the "outer boundaries" of the
power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction of the district court on the appeal. 27
If the case is appealed to the next level (to the Idaho Court of Appeals in this

case), only the higher appellate court has authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction over

25 Certain limited exceptions in the rules do allow a trial court to revisit issues in case such as clerical
errors, fraud on the court, etc.
26 I.R.C.P. 83(b) provides the district court with the authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction to remand
the case to the magistrate court for additional evidence if the record is not adequate when the case is
initially appealed from the magistrate court. NOTE: Once the case is appealed from the district court, the
district court no longer has the power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction to do this unless specifically
instructed on remand.
In a case similar to this, Judge Simpson did just that and remanded a case to Judge Heise for "further
findings of fact and conclusions of law." Since the district court (on the intial appeal) is given broad
appellate powers under IRCP 83(u)(l), Judge Simpson had the power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction
under I.R.C.P. 83(b) to remand the case for additional fact fmding Gust as the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court would have on an appeal from the district court). Bonner County Case No. CV-2006-0709, Abolafia
v. Reeves v. Adler (a case in which a dismissed Guardian Ad Litem attempted to appeal a stipulated
agreement of the parties).
27 Subject of course to other limitations such as legal theories and issues appealed by the litigants and items
set forth in I.A.R. 13.
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the case. Both the district court and magistrate court lack the power/authority/subject
matter jurisdiction over the case/issue on appeal after the case/issue is appealed from
those courts. The power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction that was granted to the
district court under I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l) is extinguished once the "notice of appeal" is filed.
When a case is remanded/remitted by an appellate court to a lower appellate court
(or to the trial court) the lower court only has authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction
over the specific matters set forth by the higher appellate court. As in this case, the
district court's spectrum of power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction is not what the
district court had under I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l) on the appeal, it is the specific, limited
authority/power subject matter jurisdiction in the opinion/remittitur of the Supreme Court
on remand. Although the district court may have had the authority/power/subject matter
jurisdiction to issue a general remand to the magistrate court on the initial appeal, the
district court no longer has that authority 28 when the case is remanded from the Supreme
Court, UNLESS said action is specifically directed in the opinion/remittitur (or an action
subsidiary thereto).
For example, if the appellate court remands a case with the following instructions
(orders): "[t]he judgment entered by the district court is vacated and remanded. Upon
remand, the district court is to determine the prevailing party pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l)(B) and award costs and attorney fees accordingly."29 ; it does not authorize the
trial court (or whatever lower court the case is remanded) to revisit summary judgment

28

Since the "general" appellate authority under I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l) was taken away when the case was
appealed from the district court - just as once the case is closed or appealed from the magistrate court, the
magistrate court is precluded from "rewinding" the case and ruling on summary judgment motions or
scheduling an "evidentiary hearing" (unless specifically directed by a higher court on remand). I.R.C.P.
83(b) would have authorized the district court to remand to the trial court during the appeal but not now,
on remand.
29 J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Intern., 130 Idaho 255, 258 (1997).
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motions filed prior to trial, nor does it allow to court to revisit evidentiary rulings made
during trial. The district court only has the authority to determine the prevailing party, if
any, and award costs/attorney fees accordingly.
In essence, when a case/issue has been appealed, the court, at the trial level, is in
the same position as a court in which a case is "closed". 30 Once the time period for appeal
has expired, the court is precluded from "re-doing" any portion of the case as the court
lacks authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction. After the case is closed, the presiding
judge lacks the authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction to "re-try" the case if he/she is
dissatisfied with the outcome. This concept makes perfect sense

res judicata/collateral

estoppel, in general, precludes a litigant from re-litigating the same case over and over
until said litigant gets a satisfying result.

In essence, each party gets one shot at

litigation, just because a case/issue is appealed and returned to a lower court does not
mean the case/issue is allowed to be re-litigated UNLESS so ordered (specifically) by the
higher appellate court. This concept makes perfect sense: Why should a party be forced
to re-litigate a case/issue just because the trial court or the losing party is unhappy with
the results on appeal? 31 If this was allowed, a case could potentially never end - a
continuous "ping-pong" match from the appellate court to the trial court.
Based on the opinion issued by the Supreme Court, only the district court (not the
magistrate division thereof), has subject matter jurisdiction over the remanded issues.
The district court's authority/power is limited and subject to the restraints set forth in the
30 In general - assuming the case's trial is over, post trial motions have taken place and final judgment has
been issued (not including certain exceptions allowing a party to "re-open a case for fraud, etc. and
collection of the judgment).
31 It appears in this case that the trial court is dissatisfied with the record as it applies to the ruling of the
Supreme Court. From a legal standpoint, if an "evidentiary hearing" is engineered to "re-do" the facts, the
trial court's discretion is much more broad and more difficult to appeal. In essence, if the facts are skewed
towards the former parenting coordinator by the trier-of-fact, Petitioner would have to prove an "abuse of
discretion" on appeal.
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opm1on of the Supreme Court (as set forth in the remittitur).

Any action by the

magistrate court relating to the remanded issues at this juncture is without
authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction and in violation of the Supreme Court's
opinion/order. Any action by the district court that is not within the restraints set forth in
the Supreme Court's opinion are without authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction and
in direct violation of the Supreme Court's order.
As set forth above, "[t]he general rule is that, on remand, a trial court [in this
instance, the district court, in its appellate capacity] has authority to take actions it is
specifically directed to take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the

appellate court." 32 (emphasis added).

"Subsidiary to the actions directed by the

appellate court" as used in the general rule has been analyzed multiple times by the Idaho
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. It appears to mean that those additional legal
issues that ripen (from a legal analysis standpoint) naturally after the specific issue on
remand is resolved. In essence, the court has authority/power to move the case forward
on those issues that take place after or stem from the "directed actions" but not to rewind
or redo issues that procedurally take place before the "directed actions." For example,
when the appellate court reverses the trial court on the issue of liability of a party, the
question of attorney fees and/or costs is a " . . . subsidiary issue fairly comprised
therein." 33 Logically, since a determination that a party who was once held liable is
reversed (and the same party is now not liable following remand), a new "prevailing
party" analysis is required to determine who now may be entitled to attorney fees and

32

State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886 (2000).
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Intern., 130 Idaho 255, 258 (1997) citing Industrial Inv. Corp. v. Rocca,
102 Idaho 920, 923 (I 982).

33
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costs (an issue that procedurally follows the actions that the court was specifically
directed to take).
In this case, as set forth above, the district court, in its appellate capacity, has been
"specifically directed" to "determine"34 whether the acts performed by Sahlin fit within
the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in its opinion. Logic, I.R.C.P. 83 and the caselaw
herein, dictate that additional "fact-finding", "evidence gathering", or "re-trying the case"
is not a" ... subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein."
On page 5 of the district court's "REMITTITUR Clarified"35 , the district court
claims that remand to the magistrate court is required since the opinion/remittitur from
the Supreme Court requires" ... a factual determination for the trial court to make, either
from a review of the record or upon consideration of additional evidence." I refer the
Court to the analysis set forth above

the district court, not the magistrate division

thereof, is directed to make the "determination." The Supreme Court did not order a
"factual determination" that includes "consideration of additional evidence", only a
"determination. " 36
Although it appears the analysis and case law set forth above adequately shows
that the district court is required to make the determination based on the record,
Appellant will analyze the plain and ordinary meaning of "determine/determination" as it
is used by the Supreme Court in the opinion at issue.
Note that "determine" or "determination" are not overly broad, open-ended terms. See Akers v. D. L
White Const., 142 Idaho 293, 305 (2005) (Akers I) where the Supreme Court's opinion directs the district
court (trial court in this case) for "additional fact finding" and "determination". See also Akers v. D.L.
White Const., 147 Idaho 39 (2009) (Akers II) and the Judge Mitchell's memorandum opinion following the
second remand dated May 3, 2010.
35 Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, page 55.
36 As set forth in a previous footnote, I.R.C.P. 83(b) allows the district court to remand to the magistrate
court if the appellate record is not "adequate" - but this rule does not apply to the district court once the
case is appealed to a higher court- any power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction is limited to the specific
instructions set forth in the opinion/remittitur.
34
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First, based on the analysis above, the specific instructions set forth by the higher
court represent the only authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction on remand. In this
case, the "district court" is ordered to make the "determination". As analyzed in prior
filings by Appellant, under the Idaho Appellate Rules the "district court" means the
"district court" and not the "magistrate division thereof." Therefore the opinion means
what it says

the district court is ordered to make the "determination."

Second, the district court sits as an appellate court in this case 37 , not a fact-finding
court, and as such, is limited to the evidence on the record. It can be assumed that the
Supreme Court knows exactly what it is doing - a remand to a lower appellate court to
make a determination means that the determination relates to evidence on the record (not
"additional evidence"). Therefore, the opinion means what is says

the district court is

ordered to make the "determination" from evidence on the record.
Finally,

the

most

persuasive

evidence

of

the

plain

meamng

of

"determine/determination" is from the Court's "REMITTITUR Clarified" when the
district court cited I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l). 38 I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l) states in part: " ... the district
court shall review the case on the record and determine the appeal as an appellate court..
." (emphasis added).

The only reasonable meaning of "determine/determination" in this

context is that the record is the sole source for the "facts", the district court is precluded
from additional fact-finding, either by itself or through a strawman (the magistrate court).
Again, the district court only has power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction over the
specific issues set forth in the opinion/remittitur.

37

Not with the powers set forth in I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l), but the limited, specific jurisdiction on remand set
forth in the opinion,remittitur.
38 Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, page 52.
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Judge Peterson appeared to be focused on going forward with a two (2) hour
"evidentiary hearing" - in reality, re-trying the "case." Judge Peterson then transferred
the case to district court where Judge Simpson issued a general order of remand in record
time - which by its terms, may include "retrying" the case. Then, the district court
(Judge Luster) remanded the case with fairly open terms which may include
"consideration of additional evidence" (retrying the case).
This case was initially appealed to the district court (Judge Hosack).

Under

I.R.C.P. 83(b), Judge Hosack had the power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction to
remand the case if the record was not "adequate." Judge Hosack affirmed the magistrate
court's decision in a "brief order without a memorandum opinion."39 The district court's
ability to exercise the power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction conferred by I.R.C.P.
83(b) evaporated when Appellant filed an appeal. 40
The case next went to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals had the ability
to remand the case to the trial court if the record was not "adequate". The Court of
Appeals ruled in Appellant's favor and appeared to have ample evidence/facts to arrive at
its decision. Sahlin then filed a Petition for Review to the Idaho Supreme Court which
was accepted. The time for the Court of Appeals to remand the case for "additional
evidence/facts" has long passed.
The Idaho Supreme Court was m charge of the third level of appeal.

The

Supreme Court issued an opinion on July 8, 2010, and ruled in Appellant's favor and

Hausladen v. Knoche, 2010 Opinion No. 82 (2010), pg. 3.
Although the case is once again in district court, the powers of I.R.C.P. 83(b) have not been resurrected
- the district court is limited to the power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction set forth in the
opinion/remittitur. Again this case is now on remand from the Supreme Court, not on appeal from the
magistrate court.
39

40
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awarded Appellant's costs. On page 3 - 4 of said opinion the Court set forth its "Standard
of Review" included:

"If the magistrate court's findings of fact are supported by

substantial and competent evidence and the conclusions of law follow from the findings
of fact, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we will affirm the
district court's decision." In the next paragraph of the opinion, on page 4, under the
heading "The district court erred in affirming the magistrate court's judgment ordering
Hausladen to pay for Sahlin's services", the Court said: "This Court finds that the district
court erred in affirming the magistrate court's judgment ordering Hausladen to pay for
Sahlin's services, but we remand for a determination regarding what services provided by
Sahlin, if any, fall within the authority of LC. [Section] 32-717D(3) and LR.C.P.
16(1)(1 )."
As set forth in the "Standard of Review", the Supreme Court analyzed "[i]f the
magistrate court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence ..
." The Supreme Court did not rule that the findings of fact were flawed. Nor did the
Supreme Court rule that there was not "substantial and competent evidence" in this case.
However, the Supreme Court did order the district court to use LC. [Section] 32-717D(3)
and LR.C.P. 16(1)(1) to make a "determination". 41 Since the Supreme Court analyzed
this "factual" issue, as set forth in the "Standard of Review", and did not rule that there
was not "substantial and competent evidence", then by "default", the Supreme Court
affirmed that the record was adequate and it cannot be disturbed on remand.
Nowhere in the Supreme Court's opinion does it instruct the district court to
collect additional evidence (either by itself or through the magistrate court).

41

The

The magistrate court used the wrong law, therefore the magistrate court's holding was incorrect and since
the district court affirmed the magistrate court on appeal, the district court was incorrect.
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Supreme Court had the power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction to remand the case for
additional evidence

which it obviously did not. When the case is in district court, the

Supreme Court lacks the power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction to order additional
evidence or fact finding. Since the case is on its way down (remand), the sole source of
the district court's authority/power/subject matter jurisdiction stems from the Idaho
Supreme Court's opinion. No specific action in the opinion related to "consideration of
new evidence", "fact-finding" or a new trial.
The Supreme Court has spoken, the district court makes the "determination". No
new evidence or facts may be added to the record.
As argued previously, the only powers a court has on remand are those
specifically set forth by the appellate court in its opinion/remittitur. It appears in the
"REMITTITUR Clarified" that the district court at least "hints" that irregardless of what
the opinion instructs the district court to do, cases such as this always go back to the trial
court. Although the arguments and authority set forth previously by Appellant should
suffice to convince the court that this premise is incorrect, here are some additional
cases/authority supporting Appellant's position:
1. Cases involving an appeal originating from the magistrate division of the district
court that were appealed to district court then to the Court of Appeals and/or the
Supreme Court. The district court was "skipped" altogether on remand (since that
process was specifically set forth in the opinion/remittitur)42 :

Defeats the "argument" that as a "normal course of business" the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals
always remands to the district court so the district court can immediately remand to the trial court. As
previously argued (as stated in the cases cited by Petitioner), the district court is empowered to only do
those specific actions set forth in the opinion/remittitur.
42
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a. State v. Johnson, 138 Idaho 103, 108 (App. 2002): "We therefore vacate
the judgment of conviction and remand the matter to the magistrate court
for further proceedings."
b. Mulch v. Mulch, 125 Idaho 93, 101 (1994): "We remand the case to the
magistrate judge for consideration of the amount of spousal maintenance
to award ... "
c. Larson v. Larson, 139 Idaho 970 (2004) - judgment of the magistrate
court (not the district court) was reversed in part and remanded directly to
the magistrate court.
2. Case involving an appeal originating from the magistrate division of the district
court that was appealed to district court then to the Court of Appeals and/or the
Supreme Court. The decisions of both the district court and magistrate court are
reversed (compare with just the district court's in this case):
a. Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housal, 140 Idaho 96, 105 (2004): "The
decisions of the district court and the magistrate court are reversed and the
case is remanded [to the magistrate court]."
We are once again back at the beginning of the same argument - on remand, a
court only has the power/authority/subject matter jurisdiction to do the specific actions
set forth in the opinion/remittitur. No less, and in this case, no more - the district court
was required to make the "determination" on remand. The district court failed to do so, it
attempted to transfer this authority to the magistrate court which, by law, was outside the
district court's authority/jurisdiction. Since the district court lacked authority/jurisdiction
to remand the case to the magistrate court prior to making a "determination", said order
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of remand is void/voidable. Any action taken by the magistrate court on "the Parenting
Coordinator Issue" stems from the district court's void/voidable remand which results in
the magistrate court acting without jurisdiction/authority.

Therefore, any order or

judgment entered by the magistrate court on "the Parenting Coordinator Issue" is void.

ISSUE #3: The district court's "ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL" resulted in an
error in law.
On March 29, 2012, District Judge John Patrick Luster entered an "ORDER OF
CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL OF APPEAL" 43 stating the following:

On February 24, 2012, the magistrate entered an
Order Regarding Parenting Coordinator Fees, and on
February 28, 2012, the magistrate entered a Judgment.
On February 29, 2012, the Appellant filed a 'Notice of
Appeal.'
The Appellant's appeal is conditionally
dismissed for the following:
1. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(k) requires
that the appellant 'shall pay the estimated fee
for preparation of the transcript as
determined by the transcriber within
fourteen (14) days after filing of the notice of
appeal.' In this matter, the Appellant has not
paid the estimated fee for preparation of the
transcript, and no transcript has been
produced.
2. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) requires
that, in cases with multiple claims at issue,
the court may execute a certificate that
certifies a judgment on a claim as final. In
this case, the Judgment does not contain any
such Rule 54(b) certificate.
3. Idaho Appellate Rule 12 requires permission
from the magistrate to appeal from an
interlocatory order or judgment. In this
matter, the magistrate has not addressed
whether the Order Regarding Parenting

43

Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, pages 398- 399.

Appellant's Brief

27

Coordinator Fees is an interlocatory order
such that permission to appeal must be given.
As a result of these deficiencies, this Court here
by enters a CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL of the
Appellant's appeal. The Appellant has thirty
(30) days from the date of this order to correct
the deficiencies. If the deficiencies are not
corrected, then this Court will enter a dismissal.

In response to Judge Luster's conditional dismissal, Appellant filed a
"MOTION/REQUEST RE: 'ORDER OF CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL OF APPEAL'
and accompanying briet44•

In Appellant's brief, the following was set forth in the

conclusion:
Following the explanation above, Appellant
believes that the Court will recognize that it has made
an honest mistake and will strike/delete/cancel/reverse
its 'Order of Conditional Dismissal of Appeal' and
proceed in the normal course of business with this
appeal. In the alternative, Appellant requests/moves
the Court to clarify its position in said order so
Appellant knows specifically what the alleged defects
are so the defects can be corrected and this appeal can
progress forward.
As set forth above, none of the 'deficiencies' set
forth by the Court its conditional dismissal of appeal
are present. Absent a specific clarification by the
district court, there is no reasonable way that Appellant
can comply with the district court's conditional
dismissal since the district court has merely stated the
reasons for dismissal without disclosing a 'holding.'
Appellant has explained why the 'deficiencies' are not
present and awaits the Court's analysis and reasonable
. 45
exp lana t ion.·

In response to Appellants motion and brief, Judge Luster entered an "AMENDED
ORDER OF CONDITIONAL DISMISSAL OF APPEAL" and gave Appellant thirty (30)
days to correct the "revised" "deficiencies"46 :

44

Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, pages 401-408.
Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, pages 407-408.
46 Note that Judge Luster acknowledged that a transcript was not required for the appeal since the transcript
was already prepared over six (6) years ago as set forth in Appellant's Notice of Appeal - SEE Clerk's
Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, page 387
45
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1. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) requires that,
in cases with multiple claims at issue, the court may
execute a certificate that certifies a judgment on a
claim as final. In this case, the Judgment does not
contain any such Rule 54(b) certificate.
2. Idaho Appellate Rule 12 requires permission from
the magistrate to appeal from an interlocatory
order or judgment. In this matter, the magistrate
has not addressed whether the Order Regarding
Parenting Coordinator Fees is an interlocatory
order such that permission to appeal must be
,
47
given.

I.R.C.P. 60(c) states: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by these rules, a motion to
modify child custody or child support orders shall be served and adjudicated in
substantially the same manner as an original proceeding ... "
I.R.C.P. 83(a) sets forth the decisions ("judgments or orders") of magistrates that
may be appealed to the district court. I.R.C.P. 83(a)(2) states: "[a]ny of the judgments or
orders in an action in the magistrate's division which would be appealable from the
district court to the Supreme Court under Rule 11 of the Idaho Appellate Rules."
I.AR. 11 sets forth the types of judgments or orders that a litigant can appeal "as
a matter of right." I.A.R. 1 l(a)(7) states that any order made after final judgment may be
appealed from district court to the Supreme Court (and, thus, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(a),
from magistrate court to district court).
I.R.C.P. 54(b) states: "[a] judgment is final if either it has been certified as final
pursuant to subsection (b)(1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for
relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action. " 48
The district court's reasons for dismissal of the appeal are simply wrong. In fact,
the legal reasoning for the dismissal is "so" obviously wrong 49, it makes one wonder
47
48

Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, page 411.
I.R.C.P. 54(a).
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what is really going on in this case. The district court issued the conditional dismissal on
its own behalf without any motion or objection from Sahlin (how often does this occur?).
In fact, it lends credence to Judge Peterson's statement set forth ealier in this brief: "Mr.
Hausladen may have won the appeal, but he has lost since the case has been remanded to
this court." It appears that some secret local rule in Kootenai County has been invoked to
preclude Appellant from seeking any justice on the underlying "parenting coordinator
issue." 50
Please note Judge Luster's first reason for conditional dismissal of the appeal set
forth in the original order entered on 3-29-12 51

(" . . •

the Appellant has not paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the transcript, and no transcript has been produced.") 52

-

even though Appellant clearly stated in his notice of appeal that: "[a]ll transcripts related
to this appeal have already been prepared when this case was appealed the first time
approximately six (6) years ago and are part of the clerk's record" 53

.

Obviously common

sense dictates that a litigant does not have to reorder and pay for a transcript twice 54 in
order to go forward with an appeal. Judge Luster eventually deleted this item as a reason
for dismissal but only after Appellant was forced to spend considerable time and effort
briefing the matter. Again, if one looks through what has happened in this case following
remand, it definitely appears to be a concerted effort to "quash" the "parenting
coordinator issue" (even worse than the original appeal).

49 Especially if one looks at the first reason in the original order (Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 402742012, page 398) which is absolutely ridiculous legally and factually- see analysis herein.
50 Last "time" through the appeal process Appellant was simply treated like his position was outrageous and
foolish, this time around it appears Appellant is facing a "full court press" to prevent an appeal from
"escaping" the Kootenai County Courthouse.
51 Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, page 398.
52 Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, page 398.
53 Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, page 387.
54 Which in this case was over $625.00.
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The first reason for dismissal (on the "corrected" dismissal55 ) assumes that the
only way a judgment can become "final" for purposes of appeal is through the I.R.C.P.
54(b) certification process. The second reason for dismissal of appeal is: " ... the
magistrate has not addressed whether the Order Regarding Parenting Coordinator Fees is
an interlocatory order such that permission to appeal must be given." 56 As set forth
analyzed below, both of the reasons for dismissal of the appeal are mistakes in law
(blatant and obvious) for which this Court exercises free review.
As the court is aware, the underlying case is a custody case. Appellant/Father is
the Plaintiff and Mother is the Defendant. On or about 5-14-2001, Mother and Father
entered into a stipulation regarding child custody and an order was entered on 5-29-2001.
On or about 10-14-2003, Mother filed a petition for change of custody. On or about 1114-2004, after two (2) days of trial, Father won the change of custody trial on a directed
verdict. The new order relating to child custody matters was entered on or about 2-2-05.
Said order appointed John Sahlin as the parenting coordinator. On 12-30-05, Magistrate
Judge Barry Watson terminated John Sahlin as a parenting coordinator and entered the
written order on 1-11-06. On or about 5-17-06, the former parenting coordinator, John
Sahlin filed a motion for order to show cause and for entry of judgment. The former
parenting coordinator's motion for order to show cause was heard on 6-5-06 and a
judgment in favor of the former parenting coordinator was entered on 6-7-06.

57

Father

subsequently filed a notice of appeal in the district court for the issues related to the
parent coordinator. Shortly thereafter, a transcript of the relevant hearings was ordered,

Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, page 411.
Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, page 411.
57 See IRCP 54(a) and 83(a) and I.AR. 11 referenced herein as well as Spokane Structures, Inc. v.
Equitable Investment, LLC, 148 Idaho 616 (2010).
55

56
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the transcriber provided Father with an estimate, the estimate was paid by Father and the
transcript was prepared. The issues related the parenting coordinator were later appealed
to the Court of Appeals by Father and the Idaho Supreme Court by the former parenting
coordinator. On or about 8-9-2010 the Idaho Supreme Court issued a remittitur to the
district court. 58
For purposes of the initial appeal (the same "case" that is on appeal now), the
district court, Idaho Court of Appeals and Idaho Supreme Court correctly treated the
appeal as complying with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Idaho Appellate
Rules.
This Court, Appellant and the former parenting coordinator find themselves in a
precarious position - an appeal of an issue which resulted in a "final judgment" in favor
of an individual who is not a party and has no standing to intervene in the case. It has
always been and remains the position of the Appellant that John Sahlin, the former
parenting coordinator has no standing to take part in this case/appeal. Sahlin has never
been a party 59 , never filed any document to properly intervene in the case (including
filing the required fee) and has never filed any document while acting as parenting show
cause (for which no order to show cause was issued) five (5) months after being
dismissed as a parenting coordinator. In short, no matter how you slice it, Sahlin had no
legal basis or standing to intervene in this case. The magistrate court had no jurisdiction
over the matter. The issue of standing was raised at the hearing (by objection) and at
every level of appeal.

The district court, Court of Appeals, Supreme Court and

magistrate court (on remand) have never addressed this issue and never making a legal
Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, pages 191 - 200 for a more detailed rendition of the facts
ffior to remand from the Supreme Court.
9 See Abolafia v. Reeves, 152 Idaho 898 (2012).
58
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ruling on the issue. The issue has not been ruled upon, therefore under Idaho law the
issue remains as a valid issue on this "re-appeal" and an absolute defense for Appellant.
Please note that "standing" is jurisdictional and may be raised at anytime. 60
Does this mean that if a judge allows an individual who has no standing to
improperly intervene into a case and obtain the judgment that said judgment cannot be
appealed because the "judgment creditor" is not a party? Is this what the district court is
inferring with its conditional dismissal? Noone can know for sure, since the district court
failed to support its holding with any meaningful analysis

even after Appellant

specifically requested a " ... factual and legal explanation describing why Appellant's
notice of appeal should be dismissed ..."

61

It appears that by any analysis of the rules

that the judgment entered by Judge Watson in favor of Sahlin on 6-7-06 was, on its own,
a "final judgment" between Father and the Sahlin (former parenting coordinator). After
all, it has been treated as a "final judgment" for over six (6) years through three (3) levels
of appeal and remand. The "final judgment" on remand ("Order Regarding Parenting
Coordinator Fees") was entered on 2-24-12 and the judgment related to said order was
entered on 2-28-12. Appellant's notice of appeal was filed 2-29-12.
As the Court is aware, a child custody case is a strange animal - every time a
petition for change of custody is filed, it is treated as a new "case"62 • Even if the
judgment entered by Magistrate Judge Barry Watson in favor of the former parenting
coordinator is not a "final judgment" under the rules, said judgment was entered AFTER

60

See Diamond v. Sandpoint Title Ins., 132 Idaho 145 (1998), H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. Of
Profl Eng'rs & Land Surveyors. 113 Idaho 646 ( 1987), White v. Stiner, 36 Idaho 129 (1922).
61 Clerk's Record on Appeal, S.Ct. # 40274-2012, page 401; See also 401 - 408 for a more detailed
analysis of Appellant's request for a legal and factual analysis by the district court.
62 Pursuant to IRCP 60(c) (as well as other rules), a new filing fee must be paid by the moving party,
personal service is required on the nonmoving party, evidence that arose prior to the last order (ie- a res
judicata - type concept to prevent re-litigating issues raised in the prior trial) generally is not allowed, etc.
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a "final judgment". As set forth above, an IRCP 54(a) "final judgment"63 was entered on
5-29-01 and 2-2-05. This case has only had two (2) parties -Mother and Appellant. The
orders referenced above by any analysis represent a final judgment that may be appealed.
IRCP 83(a) sets forth orders/judgments that may be appealed from magistrate court to
district court.

A final judgment (see IRCP 54(a)) may be appealed as well as any

order/judgment that can be appealed from district court to the supreme court under IAR
11 (IRCP 83(a)(2)). 64 IAR ll(a)(7) states that any order made after final judgment may
be appealed from district court to the supreme court (and thus, pursuant to IRCP 83(a)(2)
from magistrate court to district court). For purposes of this appeal, the judgment/order
in question is either a "final judgment" on its own or a judgment/order entered after final
judgment either of which may be appealed and neither of which are permissive appeals.
The legal basis for the district court's dismissal of Appellant's appeal have
resulted in a mistake in law. The analysis set forth above as well as the analysis provided
by Appellant to the district court clearly show that the district court's action was
incorrect. The district court further placed Appellant in a "catch 22" by failing to set
forth a holding (a basis or analysis for the district court's conclusion) even after
Appellant requested the district court to present an " . . . analysis and reasonable
explanation" for the dismissal. How can Appellant "fix" anything when nothing was
wrong? Obviously, under the law, Appellant's appeal should not have been dismissed.

63

IRCP 54(b) is not applicable to this case - as stated, there have never been multiple parties (ie more than
one plaintiff or more than one defendant) nor has there been multiple claims Gust custody issues until
Sahlin was allowing the intervene in the case following his dismissal as the Parenting Coordinator).
64 See also Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316 (Ct. App.1984 ).
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CONCLUSION/RELIEF SOUGHT

As analyzed above, the reasons for the district court's dismissal of Appellant's
appeal are erroneous and have resulted in a mistake in law. More importantly, "The
Parenting Coordinator Issue" should never had been decided within the confines of this
custody case and decisions/rulings/orders/judgments related to the former Parenting
Coordinator (Sahlin) following his removal are void/voidable for lack of jurisdiction (on
multiple levels as analyzed above).

Appellant requests this Court to rule that all orders

and/or judgments entered by the magistrate court following the dismissal of the Parenting
Coordinator are void and are therefore vacated.
In the alternative, Appellant requests that the district court's ORDER
DISMISSING APPEAL dated 6/14/12 (and entered 6/20/12) (including the two
Conditional Orders of Dismissal on which said Order of Dismissal is based) be vacated
and Appellant be allowed to go forward with the appeal in district court.
Appellant requests any and all costs and attorney fees allowed pursuant to I.A.R.
40 and I.A.R. 41.
Dated this
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, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

/

9i9,7

day o f $ -

, 2013, I served

a true and correct copy of the foregoing on the individuals listed below by U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid:

John Sahlin, Respondent
P.O. Box 194
Coeur d'Alene, Id 83816
Shari Colene Knoche, Defendant
c/o Richard Kochansky
408 Sherman A venue, Suite 309
Coeur d'Alene, Id 83814
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